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06 Pages : 42-52

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(IV-I).06      10.31703/gssr.2019(IV-I).06      Published : Mar 2019

Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China

    This analysis focus corporate social responsibility and executive compensation in China and also tests the relationship between state possession and executive compensation in presence of CSR. The estimated results confirm our hypotheses true in the selected sample of 2011 to 2014 of China. The firms with high CSR performances positively moderate the previously negative or no relationship between state-ownership and executive compensation. Application of 2SLS and GMM guaranteed the robustness of the results to potential endogeneities.

    CSR Performance; Executive Compensation; StateOwnership; Agency Theory; China
    (1) Abdur Rauf
    Assistant Professor,Department of Economics,Abbottabad University of Science and Technology, Abbottabad, KP, Pakistan.
    (2) Kashif Amin
    Assistant Professor,Department of Management Sciences,Qurtuba University, Peshawar, KP, Pakistan.
    (3) Zafar Saleem
    Assistant Professor, Mohi-ud-Din Islamic University, AJK, Pakistan.

13 Pages : 207-236

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2018(III-III).13      10.31703/gssr.2018(III-III).13      Published : Sep 2018

Value Boosters or Dampers? Insights Of Corporate Governance Practices From Pakistan

    Rampant corporate failures have placed corporate governance in the limelight again however not all governance practices help firms in enhancing value. This empirical research examines impact of corporate governance practices on shareholders' value represented by earning per share of 243 listed firms on Pakistani Bourse. It ensued in the conclusion that overall corporate governance tends to have significant impact on earnings per share and reveals dichotomy of corporate governance practices based on direction of their association with share holders' value and terms them as value boosters and value dampers. It has also been found that pro-entrenchment practices tend to lower earnings per share in the listed firms either due to complacency or vested interests while rest of the practices help in enhancing value earned on each share thus endorsing the theoretical perspectives emanating out of agency and shareholder activism theories. This study emphasizes the significance of Board Attendance, Board Independence, Non-duality of CEOChairman Role for listed firms' value. It also shows that entrenchment acts like larger boards, directors' ownership, large block holders and disclosure of such ownership can adversely impact the firms' value and thus play a significant role in scaring away the potential investors who primarily look at earnings per share for buying of stocks of a particular company. It entails policy implications that implementation of counter-entrenchment regulations needs strengthening as the existing seem to have cosmetic effect. Identification and implementation of good governance practices can be best ensured when propagated in the perspective of value enhancement.

    Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, Earning per Share, Entrenchment, Shareholder Activism.
    (1) Abida Razzaq
    Ph.D Scholar, Department of Leadership & Management Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (2) Ghulam Shabbir Khan Niazi
    Professor, Lahore Business School, University of Lahore, Islamabad Campus, Pakistan.

39 Pages : 392 - 405

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2021(VI-II).39      10.31703/gssr.2021(VI-II).39      Published : Jun 2021

Do the Investment Distortions Affect the Performance of Non-financial Firms of Pakistan?

    The investment decisions are very important for investors as it directly affects the firm's future profitability and shareholder's wealth. Firm managers are involved in making inefficient investment decisions in imperfect capital markets. This study aims to examine how the inefficient investment decisions influence the firm performance after controlling for the financial factors. The two steps System Generalized method of moments is used to examine the impact of investment distortion on firm performance. The empirical analysis is based on unbalanced annual panel data set of a sample of 324 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for the period 2015 to 2017. The results show that investment distortion is negatively affecting the performance of non-financial firms in Pakistan; irrespective of the proxy used to measure the firm performance. These results support the information asymmetry theory and agency theory, which explains why managers are involved in making sub-optimal investment decisions at the cost of shareholders' wealth and why their inefficient investment decisions can damage the value of the firm.

    Agency Theory, Information Asymmetry, Investment Distortions, Performance
    (1) Sameen Aftab
    Lecturer, Faculty of Management Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (2) Faisal Rizwan
    Associate Professor, Faculty of Management Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (3) Abdul Rashid
    Professor, International Institute of Islamic Economics (IIIE), International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.