The Military s involvement in the political system of Pakistan began from the mid-1950s and continued verily as a guardian, a praetorian, or ruler on various occasions. Its disengagement, after the direct intervention, remained usually slow and gradual. Hence, it took a long time for disengagement and created a power-sharing model instead of transferring power to the civilian elite. The pattern of civilianization adopted by the Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq was also adopted by the Musharraf regime with few changes. In his early days, though, General Pervaiz Musharraf demonstrated intention for economic revival, accountability, devolution of power, and democratic consolidation as his foremost goals and took some steps towards that direction but he abruptly reversed those steps when he sensed a threat to his dominating position in a self-created system. This paper is an attempt to critically analyze the process of civilianization during the period under consideration based on the theoretical framework and practical norms of the democratic system.

This paper studies the pre and post Kargil war events. It also elaborates the calculation and miscalculations of Kargil adventure from the top military brass and the Kargil clique. This paper also describes the question of civil military relations in Pakistan and actual corridor of the decision making. It also Provides Knowledge about the plan of Kargil war, doctrine of secrecy, the aftermath of that adventure, the big bang between the civil-military leadership, the failure of diplomacy, the impact of Kargil war on political system. This paper also highlighted the attempt to get Kargil at the rate of Kashmir. It is assessed that the kagril episode had some precious consequences related to the battlefield, warfare and the supremacy of army as an institution. This paper also showed the activities happened on the freeze heights of Kargil seriously affect, politics and civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Since October 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed a predator drone armed with missiles to carry out an operation in Afghanistan that targeted suspected al-Qaeda members. These missile attacks continued to hit targets in Yemen, Afghanistan, and the Pakistani territory bordering Afghanistan. It has been proven that missile-equipped drones are uncertain when used in covert operations. Drone strikes raise legal questions under International Law, Human Rights Law (HRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL prohibits civilian organisations from participating in direct hostilities unless the government notifies them of their incorporation into the regular armed forces. The explanation for why the CIA does not have the authorisation to carry out drone strikes is given in the article. The deployment of the CIA rather than regular armed forces is a violation of both accepted norms of war and HRL regulations.

Pakistan faced severe challenges of violent extremism and terrorism after US invasion of Afghanistan. The successive governments pursued both political and military means to bring an end to this problem but to no avail. The war against terrorism was highly unpopular among the people and it was the main cause of failure to combat terrorism. In 2013, the newly formed government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to give peace a chance after a decision of an All Parties Conference (APC). Consequently, the dialogue process, through the committee members nominated by the government and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ensued that kindled the hope of peace and stability in the country. However, the process was crippled after a few months and government launched a military operation against TTP and other militant outfits in the country. The paper explores the factors that lead the government to start peace talks with TTP and analyzes the challenges that dialogue process faced and ultimately caused its failure. Finally, it highlights the benefits, particularly the national consensus to combat terrorism that dialogue process produced despite its failure to bring peace in the country.

Pakistan and the United States have had a history of complex relations since the former's inception. After the 9/11 attacks, changes were observed in the foreign policy of the United States towards Pakistan, followed by a strategic shift in Pakistan’s approach towards its ally in Afghanistan. This study aims to analyze the implications of the post-9/11 Pak-U.S. alliance by examining the impacts of terrorism and U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan’s national security. The theoretical framework focuses on John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. The study employs qualitative research methodology and focuses on secondary data. This research argues that as a result of the post-9/11 Pak-U.S. alliance, the national security of Pakistan was compromised. This study opines that a pragmatic foreign policy combined with a comprehensive national security approach is of paramount importance to Pakistan in order to survive and progress.