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ASSUMPTIONS OF MAKING A GOOD DEAL WITH BAD PERSON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON STRONG FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY

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16 Pages : 154-162

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020(V-I).16      10.31703/gssr.2020(V-I).16      Published : Mar 1

Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency

Abstract

    Behavioral finance challenged paradigms of standard finance by questioning rationality assumptions posed by market efficiency that had been a focal point for researches in finance and economics. This study aimed to test Strong-Form Efficient Market Hypothesis by employing data from emerging Stock Markets of Pakistan before its amalgamation and applied a different methodology. Firms were tested upon data availability and accordingly, ten firms were selected out of sixteen further for usability criteria of data. A part of the current study also validates the usefulness of dividend announcements for valuing the stock of KSE listed firms and suggested utilizing it in stock price revision. The market was found weak and strong form inefficient whereas the hypothesis for semi-strong form sustained overall

    Capital Market Efficiency, Strong form Efficiency, Emerging Markets, Dividend Announcements, Insider Trading.

    (1) Taqadus Bashir
    Associate Professor,Department of Business Studies,Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (2) Kanwal Iqbal Khan
    Assitant Professor,Institute Of Business & Management,University of Engineering & Technology, Lahore, Pakistan.
    (3) Saima Urooge
    Assistant Professor,Department of Economics, Islamia College University, Peshawar, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

    APA : Bashir, T., Khan, K. I., & Urooge, S. (2020). Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency. Global Social Sciences Review, V(I), 154-162. https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020(V-I).16

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Bashir, Taqadus, Kanwal Iqbal Khan, and Saima Urooge. 2020. "Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency." Global Social Sciences Review, V (I): 154-162 doi: 10.31703/gssr.2020(V-I).16

HARVARD

    HARVARD : BASHIR, T., KHAN, K. I. & UROOGE, S. 2020. Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency. Global Social Sciences Review, V, 154-162.

MHRA

    MHRA : Bashir, Taqadus, Kanwal Iqbal Khan, and Saima Urooge. 2020. "Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency." Global Social Sciences Review, V: 154-162

MLA

    MLA : Bashir, Taqadus, Kanwal Iqbal Khan, and Saima Urooge. "Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency." Global Social Sciences Review, V.I (2020): 154-162 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Bashir, Taqadus, Khan, Kanwal Iqbal, and Urooge, Saima (2020), "Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency", Global Social Sciences Review, V (I), 154-162

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Bashir, Taqadus, Kanwal Iqbal Khan, and Saima Urooge. "Assumptions of Making a Good Deal with Bad Person: Empirical Evidence on Strong Form Market Efficiency." Global Social Sciences Review V, no. I (2020): 154-162. https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020(V-I).16