Abstract

The importance of Central Asia for China increased with the change in international power structure, growth of its economy, rapid industrialization and increase in population. China is regarded as the second largest energy consumer in the world while Central Asia has rich energy resources and raw materials complementary for its economic growth. It is interested in the energy resources of Central Asia for the security of its energy supply and a large market for its finished goods. Prior to Central Asian energy resources, China was importing oil from the Middle East. The route of oil supply from M.E to China was passing through Malacca strait, under the control of United States, a perceived rival of China in the world politics. In case of conflict this route may be blocked by United States. This situation worried the Chinese policy makers and prepared a comprehensive policy regarding the energy resources of Central Asian region. Energy is not the only concern of China in Central Asia; it is also worried about the security of its Xinjiang, sharing border with some Central Asian Republics (CARs). About 60% of the population of Xinjiang are Uyghur Muslims. The same ethnic community also exists on the other side of the border in the Central Asian Republics. China has an apprehension that in case of instability in the region, terrorists’ organizations may instigate the China’s Uyghur for independence. That is why, China is supporting United States in its fight against terrorism. Politically, it wants to reduce the influence of United States in the region by integration with the CARs (Central Asian Republics) through SCO particularly after US military penetration in the region in 2001. Applying a descriptive-analytical approach in the paper, the interests of China in CARs are surveyed.

Key Words

New Great Game, Central Asia, China, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Geo-economics.

Introduction

Central Asia, due to its unique geographic location and rich energy resources, has been one of the important regions of the world since long. It has been the battle ground of power politics between Russian and British Empire, commonly known as “Great Game”. This game came to an end with the disintegration of one of the empire, Soviet Union in 1991. As a result of this disintegration most of the Central Asian states got independence. China along with other big powers such as Russia and United States got an opportunity to get advantage out of this region. The ensuing power politics among the big powers is known as “New Great Game”. Here in this paper the interests of China would be analyzed by using political realistic approach. 

China’s involvement in the Central Asian “New Great Game” started soon after the collapse of Soviet Union. China was the first country which recognized the independence of the Central Asian Republics and in January, 1992 established diplomatic relations with them (Liao, 2006).

Following the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 China re-established itself as a major factor in the geopolitics of Central Asia. China’s geographical proximity, security and economic interests in the region and the Central Asian states needs and dependent status have brought them closer to each other. China and Central Asian Republics relations began in 1992, when both the countries resolved their territorial disputes. In order to give effect to their bilateral relations they formed an organization known as “Shanghai Five” in 1996, which later on became  Shanghai cooperation organization in 2001 (Zhuangzhi, 2004). 

China’s Economic Interests in Central Asia

China has been self-sufficient in energy for several years since independence. However with the growth of its economy as well as population the demand for energy resources also increased. In the year 1993 the demand of energy, particularly oil and natural gas, increased than the domestic production could support. This made China an importer of oil and natural gas and within two decades she became the world largest energy consumer and by the year 2012 she had to import about 57%of oil. If this trend continued China would have to import 66%of its oil by the year 2012. China became the second largest importer of hydrocarbon resources after United States (Xuetang, 2006). Due to rapid industrial development in China the demand for energy increased. The oil demand increased from 1.7 to 3.4 million barrel per day from 1985 to 1995 and reached to 6.8 million barrel per day in 2004. Forty percent of this demand is fulfilled from external resources (Ionia, 2010).

This situation worried the Chinese authorities and initiated numerous strategies. Domestically, the government of China encouraged natural gas and oil production and exploration, conservation of energy and the renewable energy promotion and internationally, she focused on securing energy supply chain and transit routes (Stegen, 2015).




Energy Security




Central Asian Republics and china’s interaction in the energy sector has increased since the exhaust of china’s self-sufficiency in 1990s. The growing energy demands of China increased its interests in the Central Asian Republics. Presently, China is second in energy consumption and third in its production in the world. So in energy consumption it is second to United States. This has invited competition over the energy resources in the world at large. Majority of China’s domestic energy resources are located in the north and north western regions of Xinjiang. This is why its security and stability is essential for Beijing’s economic growth and development and its security is of prime concern of China.

The independence of Central Asian Republics was followed by China’s negotiation with it regarding trade and energy for the establishment of strong hold over its energy market.

The total oil imports of china  was 122.7 million tons, out of it sixty five percent were imported from M.E. and African countries passing through Malacca strait of Indonesia (Martin, 2003).

 Presently, she imports about 2/3 of its oil from the region of Middle East. The energy policy makers of China are aware that the Middle East energy resources are vulnerable because of terrorism, military conflicts and other factors of instability. Mostly (about 80 %) China’s  oil and natural gas imports from African continent and Middle East region are passing through Sea route of Malacca strait, an area controlled by the perceived rival United States which may obstruct this sea transportation routes  in case of conflict between China and United States or its allay in the pacific (Lin, 2011). Resultantly the Strait of Malacca has become a strategic weakness for Beijing.  To cope with this situation, the Malacca dilemma, China is increasing its blue water naval capacity and capabilities, besides this it has focused on the construction of pipeline through Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar from Central Asian Republics particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Blumenthal, 2008). Due to above mentioned reasons China is in search of diversifying its energy supply imports and to reduce her depend on Middle East. In this regard the energy rich Central Asia can play an important role (Swanstrom, 2007).  China’s energy strategy is the diversification of it energy imports making it less dependent on M.E  and African states and establishing strong hold over the energy transportation routes leading from Central Asia to China through Xinjiang.   Along with the establishment of economic and political relations with CARs, it initiated its energy diversification strategy by signing energy agreements between the republic of Kazakhstan and China’s national petroleum company. CNPC got 60.3 % shares in Kazakhstan’s Akzubin project in 1993, which later on in the year 2003 increased to 85.6 % (Hawkins and Robert, 2006). 

Alongside an agreement was signed between china and the republic of Kazakhstan for the construction of oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang region via mainland china, and its further distribution to eastern region of it. Besides it, it also entered into an agreement with the republic of Turkmenistan for the construction of natural gas pipeline from it to Xinjiang and also an oil pipeline from there to enter into Kazakh-China oil pipeline. China involved herself in the Central Asian oil and gas sector, developed oil pipeline from Kazakhstan and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. To further secure energy supply China has increased its engagement in the Caspian and CARs (Stegen, 2015). Cooperation in energy sector between China and Turkmenistan started in the end of 20th century. Mitsubishi, a Turkmen gas company and CNPC in 1992 proposed for the delivery of the natural gas of Turkmenistan to Beijing. The two companies agreed on the feasibility study of the said project and in 1996 it was finalized (Lonela, 2010).  Two years later the government of China and Turkmenistan arrived at an agreement of delivering 30 billion cubic meters gas from the republic of Turkmenistan to china in the ensuing 30 years (Niazi, 2006). Similarly in pursuance of its energy strategy in Central Asia, china’s National Petroleum Company signed an agreement with the republic of Kazakhstan in 1997 for buying sixty percent AktobeMunay gas. Along with it in the next year it signed another agreement with Kazakhstan regarding the exploration of its western oil fields (Kaliyeva, 2004).After that China national petroleum company (CNPC) got fifty percent share in the Salejan oil field of Kazakhstan in 2002, thirty percent share in North Buzaiche in the year 2003 and sixty five percent in Chevron oil and gas. This was followed by signing an agreement related to production sharing with Turkmenistan for the exploration of gas in Bagtiyarlik located in the eastern part of it. China provided $4 billion loan to the republic of Turkmenistan for the development of Yoloten gas field located in the southern region of Turkmenistan. Reciprocally, Turkmenistan increased 10 billion cubic meters gas exports to China (Succor, 2009).

Besides Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan china also made energy deals with Uzbekistan. During the Chinese president Hu Jintao visit to Uzbekistan made a contract for cooperation in oil sector of Uzbekistan with Uzbekneftegaz for the exploration and development of oil and gas on the shore of Aral Sea (Liao, 2006). Such like projects would provide China’s direct access to the energy deposits of the Republic of Uzbekistan. China’s technological services and its abilities of energy explorations further increased China’s Uzbekistan’s relations. Uzbekistan and china managed to establish long term cooperation in oil and natural gas exploitation and exploration, reciprocally; china provided a loan of $ 600 million to Uzbekistan for the construction of oil and gas pipeline (Cohen, 2006). Regarding energy imports and energy security and its diversification Yang Yu wrote, “When oil imports exceeds 100 million tons, it must take diplomatic, economic or military measures for the security of its energy” (Hawkins and Robert, 2006).  

China like other competitors in the region, US and Russia has strategic as well as commercial interests in the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Initially, China was concerned in Central Asia about the security of its Western borders adjacent to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. For a long period of time China was not dependent on the others oil because she had sufficient oil resources which could meet its domestic energy demands. But with the growth in its industries and other machines particularly automobiles the oil demand increased. In 1993 she became the big oil importer and in 2003 she went further ahead of Japan and became the second largest oil consumer in the world and the third largest importer. Its economy was growing strongly and at a very quick pace. During this period she was transforming from coal energy to hydrocarbon energy. Now China is one of the three big competitors for the Central Asian energy resources. The energy diplomacy of China acting directly or in coordination with SCO has been successful in guaranteeing sound commercial and friendly ties with growing energy suppliers like Kazakhstan. In order to get firm control over the energy resources of the Central Asian Republics, China made energy cooperation agreements with energy rich Kazakhstan and Chinese petroleum companies started investment in Kazakhstan oil field with the aim to construct a new pipeline to convey Kazakhstan oil to China thereby diversifying energy imports of China (Akihiro, 2007). For the transportation of Central Asia’s oil and gas the government of China invested Million Dollars on the construction of energy transportation pipeline connecting it with western province of China, Xinjiang (Pham, 2006). During the Turkmen president, Safir Murad Nyazove, s visit to Beijing both the countries signed an agreement for the construction of China Turkmenistan gas pipeline in 2006 (Niazi, 2006). The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline “Atasu Alashankou” was made operational in the last of 2005.

China has been commercially active to ensure long term supply contracts with former Soviet Union hydrocarbon producing states and agreed on new oil and gas transportation pipeline constructed to transport energy resources into its bordering areas. New Turkmenistan China pipeline is an example of this success which became operational in 2009 December inaugurated by Chinese president Hu Jintao. China national petroleum company completed 7000 kilo meter long gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Beijing in the year 2009. Here it should be noted that Turkmenistan is biggest gas producer in the Central Asian region like Kazakhstan which is biggest oil producer in the region. This pipeline project was financed by china. It provides china an opportunity to get additional gas supply from other Central Asian Republics as well (Blank, 2010). China has resorted to all the means and measures at its disposal to secure its domestic energy resources from terrorism in the region of Xinjiang and has used economic and diplomatic means to secure its national interests in the Central Asian region. 

Politico- Economic Interests

Conclusion

The nature of China’s historical presence in the Central Asian region has been economic growth, and internal security against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism. With the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent decline of Russian influence in the Central Asian region, China established bilateral relations with the Central Asian Republics based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence in order to get strong hold in the region. She gave considerable concessions in resolving the long standing border issues in order to create trust in their minds. This resulted in the establishment of regional security organizations such as SCO and the promotion of China’s “Grand Strategy” dragging the attention of the observers of the Western World towards the region. China’s national interests in the Central Asian states are regime security, economic stability and development and energy security. Politically she wants to mitigate United States influence, so that it may have geo-strategic advantage over her. 

However significance of Central Asia for Beijing increased with the shift in power distribution in world power structure, growth of its economy and rapid industrialization. China is regarded as the second largest energy consumer in the world while Central Asia has rich energy resources and other raw materials complementary for the economic growth, development and progress and prosperity of China. It is interested in the region’s energy resources for the security of its energy supply for its industries and a large market for its finished goods. Prior to Central Asian energy resources, during USSR period, China was mostly importing oil from the Middle East. The route of oil supply from M.E to China was passing through Malacca strait, which is under the control of United States naval forces and is prone to instability due to terrorism and sea pirates, a perceived rival of China in the world politics. In case of conflict and controversy between China and United States, this route may be blocked by United States, thereby destroying the economy of china. This situation worried the Chinese decision makers and prepared a comprehensive policy regarding the energy resources of Central Asian region. Energy is not the only concern of China in Central Asia; it is also worried about the security of its Xinjiang, sharing border with some Central Asian Republics. About 60% of the population of Xinjiang composed of Uyghur Muslims. The same ethnic community also exists on the other side of the border in the CARs. China has an apprehension that in case of instability in the region, terrorists’ organizations may instigate the Uyghur for independence. So China is supporting United States in its fight against terrorism. Politically, it wants to reduce the influence of United States in the region by integration with the CARs through bilateral and multilateral organizations particularly after US military penetration in the region in 2001.

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